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Abstract
Nowadays, most financial transactions are based on a centralized system, when all the transaction records are stored in a central location. This
centralization makes the financial system vulnerable to cyber-attacks. A
natural way to make the financial system more robust and less vulnerable
is to switch to decentralized currencies. Such a transition will also make
financial system more transparent. Historically first currency of this type
– bitcoin – use a large amount of electric energy to mine new coins and
is, thus, not scalable to the level of financial system as a whole. A more
realistic and less energy-consuming scheme is provided by proof-of-stake
currencies, where the right to mint a new coin is assigned to a randomly
selected user, with probability depending of the user’s stake (e.g., his/her
number of coins). What probabilities should we choose? In this paper, we
find the probability selection that provides the optimal result – optimal
in the sense that it is the least inductive to cheating.

1

Formulation of the Problem

Need for decentralized currencies. The existing currencies are based on the
centralized record keeping and centralized control. This centralization make the
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system vulnerable to attacks: indeed, an attack on the central depositary is suﬃcient. To make the ﬁnancial system more robust, a natural idea is to decentralize
the record keeping, to keep all the records of all the ﬁnancial transactions in as
many locations as possible – this will also help make ﬁnancial transactions more
transparent. With distributed currency, transactions are also easier and often
faster – since there is no need to contact the central bank or other centralized
authority.
This decentralization is the main idea behind cryptocurrencies.
Bitcoin – the world’s first decentralized currency: idea and its limitations. Historically the ﬁrst decentralized currency was the Bitcoin. One of
the main question that needs to be resolved when launching a new decentralized currency is how new coins are generated (“mined”). Bitcoin uses what is
called a proof-of-work protocol: to generate a new coin, it is necessary to solve
a complex time-consuming computational problem. This problem is made very
complex to purpose, to limit the number of bitcoins and thus, to avoid inﬂation.
The need of proof-of-work, however, leads to the main drawback of Bitcoin
in particular and proof-of-work scheme in general: mining of bitcoins requires
a lot of computing power and thus, a lot of electric energy. Already now, with
bitcoins constituting a very small part of the ﬁnancial system, their mining
takes on (and thus wastes) a dis-proportionally huge amount of electric energy.
As a result, the proof-of-work protocol is not very scalable – it is not realistic
to expect a signiﬁcantly larger amount of ﬁnancial transactions to distributed
currency.
Proof-of-stake protocol: a solution to bitcoin limitations. To make
distributed currencies more energy eﬃcient, it is reasonable to base the right
to mine new coins not on a new problem-to-solve, but on the current states of
diﬀerent users. For example, we can base this right on the amount of currency
(stake) that each user has. To be more precise, the probability pi of allowing
user i to mine the next coin depends on i’s stake si . Namely, the probability pi
is proportional to f (si ), for some function f (z): pi = c · f (si ), where c > 0 is
some constant.
These probabilities should add up to 1, so we must have
∑
∑
1=
pj = c ·
f (sj ),
j

hence c = ∑

1
and
f (sj )

j

f (si )
pi = ∑
.
f (sj )

(1)

j

We want to make sure that the use assigned to mint a new coin will not
disrupt the whole system. Clearly, users with a larger stake in the system
are more interested in preserving it, so it makes sense to have the probability
increasing when the stake increases, i.e., to use an increasing function f (z).
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This scheme is known as a proof-of-stake scheme. It is used, e.g., in Ethereum
– another popular cryptocurrency; see, e.g., [2, 3, 4, 5].
Remaining problem: how to select probabilities? The remaining question
is: what is the best way to select probabilities? In other words, what is the best
choice of the function f (z)?
Ethereum uses the simplest possible increasing function f (z) = z. In this
case:
si
(2)
pi = ∑ .
sj
j

But is this selection optimal? Maybe there are more eﬃcient functions?
What we do in this paper. In this paper, we show that the Ethereum’s
choice f (z) = z is indeed optimal – in the sense that this scheme is the most
robust against cheating.

2

Analysis of the Problem and the Main Result

What we want. One of the main ideas behind distributed currencies is to
provide transparency to all ﬁnancial transactions, to minimize possible cheating.
We therefore want to select probabilities in such a way so as to minimize the
incentives for cheating.
Main idea behind our analysis. The main idea behind our analysis of the
situation is that every user wants to maximize his/her participation in coin
mining. This is a natural desire – we never fully trust others, so if we do
something ourselves, we have the largest possible conﬁdence that the ﬁnancial
system is not damaged by inadequate coin minting actions.
What we do in this section. In this section, we show that the above idea
leads to f (z) = c · z for some c > 0 – i.e., to Ethereum’s probabilities (2).
The above idea leads to f (a) + f (b) ≤ f (a + b). Let us ﬁrst show that the
above idea leads to the super-additivity inequality
f (a) + f (b) ≤ f (a + b)

(3)

for all a > 0 and b > 0.
We will prove this by reduction to a contradiction. Indeed, suppose that
for some a and b, we have f (a) + f (b) > f (a + b). In this case, a user who
def

has m = a + b coins, can increase his probability of minting a new coin if he
ﬁctitiously splits him/herself into two “users”, with stakes a and b, accordingly.
Before the split, the probability of this user minting a coin was proportional
to f (m) = f (a + b). After the split, the probability is proportional to the sum
f (a) + f (b) and is, thus, higher.
So, the need to avoid incentives for cheating indeed leads to the inequality (3).

3

The above idea leads to f (a + b) ≤ f (a) + f (b). Let us now show that the
above idea also leads to the sub-additivity inequality
f (a + b) ≤ f (a) + f (b)

(4)

for all a > 0 and b > 0.
Indeed, suppose that for some a and b, we have f (a + b) > f (a) + f (b).
In this case, two users with stakes a and b can agree to pretend that they are
actually one user. Before this pretense, the probability that one of them will be
selected to mint the next coin is proportional to f (a) + f (b). Once they pretend
to be a single user, this probability increases to f (a + b) > f (a) + f (b). The
user can then decide between themselves who actually gets to mint the coin –
e.g., by selecting the ﬁrst user with probability
f (a)
f (a) + f (b)
and selecting the second user with the remaining probability
f (b)
.
f (a) + f (b)
This way, for each user, the probability of being selecting increases.
Indeed, for the ﬁrst user, the new probability of being selected is proportional
to
f (a)
f (a + b) ·
.
f (a) + f (b)
Since f (a + b) > f (a) + f (b), we have
f (a + b) ·

f (a)
f (a)
> (f (a) + f (b)) ·
= f (a),
f (a) + f (b)
f (a) + f (b)

i.e., the probability indeed increases.
Similarly, for the second user, the new probability of being selected is proportional to
f (b)
f (a + b) ·
.
f (a) + f (b)
Since f (a + b) > f (a) + f (b), we have
f (a + b) ·

f (b)
f (b)
> (f (a) + f (b)) ·
= f (b),
f (a) + f (b)
f (a) + f (b)

i.e., the probability indeed increases.
Thus, the only way to eliminate incentives for cheating is to select a function
f (z) that always satisﬁes the inequality (4).
Conclusion: the Ethereum-style selection f (z) = c · z is optimal. In the
previous two subsections, we showed that the only way to avoid incentives for
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cheating is to have inequalities (3) and (4) always satisﬁed. Combining these
two inequalities, we conclude that
f (a + b) = f (a) + f (b)

(5)

for all a > 0 and b > 0.
We assumed that the function f (z) is increasing. It is known (see, e.g.,
[1]) that the only increasing functions that satisfy the additivity property (5)
are functions f (z) = c · z, for some c > 0. Thus, the Ethereum-style selection
f (z) = c · z is indeed the only one optimal in our sense – i.e., the only one that
minimizes the incentives for cheating.
One can check that with this selection of probabilities, there is indeed no
incentive for cheating: a user can ﬁctitiously split into two or more pieces, two
or more user can ﬁctitiously claim that they are a single user – none of this will
change the probability of each user being selected to mint a new coin.
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